Djanogly v Djanogly [2025] EWHC 61 (Ch)

In determining preliminary issues arising on a challenge to an arbitration award made by the Golders Green Beth Din of the Union of Orthodox Hebrew Congregations, the court had to consider the relationship between sections 13 and 46 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (“AA”) and the Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 (“FLPA”). The arbitration agreement provided for the arbitration to be determined in accordance with Jewish law; that was a choice of rules applicable to the substance of the dispute for the purposes of section 46 AA.

Under Jewish law there is no general concept of limitation for monetary claims.

However, section 13 AA (which is a mandatory provision for arbitrations seated in England) provides that the Limitation Acts (which includes the FLPA) applies to arbitral proceedings as they apply to court proceedings.  By section 1 FLPA, where, in court proceedings in England, the law of any other country is to be taken into account in determining any matter, the law of that other country relating to limitation, not English limitation law, is to apply to the proceedings.   The question was whether notwithstanding that there is no general period of limitation under the parties’ chosen law, English limitation law applied to the claims made in the arbitration.

There was no authority directly on point. Miles J held, applying analogous case-law (in particular Halpern v Halpern [2007] EWCA Civ 291) that Jewish law is not the law of another country for the purposes of section FLPA and that English limitation law was not disapplied. The court held that the tribunal had failed to address a limitation defence based on English law and its failure to do so was a serious irregularity within section 68(2)(d) AA.

The court dismissed all the other challenges based on alleged lack of jurisdiction and other alleged serious procedural irregularities. 

To read the full judgment of Djanogly v Djanogly [2025] EWHC 61 (Ch) please click here.

Elizabeth Weaver instructed by GSC Solicitors LLP acted for the Second Defendant.